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ADDRESS CF SENATCR tvliKE HANSFIELD (D., NCNTANA)

Commencement Exercises
Gonzaga University, Spokane, vJashington
Sunday, !1ay

2l~,

1959

THE GEruiJAJ."\! CCNFERENCES AND PEACE

As you !-"•.now, there :Ls a conference of foreign ministers in progress in Geneva.
followed in the
short,

\'le

are

sm~mer

embarl~ed

This conference is likely to be

by a meeting of heads of states.
on

~·Jhat

In

may prove to be extended negotia-

tions i n an effort to untangle the problems of peace which have
accumulated in the wake of

Ho~ld ~Jar

II.

iJe cannot forsee hm·1 long this process of negotiation
may go on.

the end.

Nor can we p4edict what it is

lil~ely

to produce in

It is suffi cient to the moment, hov1ever, if the ne-

gotiations represent a serious effort to make a start in cutting
th~ot:.gh

the jungle of sterile slogans in "tolhich the problems of

Germany anc Cent4al Europe have been so long enmeshed.

It is

sufficient if a serious effort is made to find, in this jungle,
I

the clearings of reason, the areas of adjestment of bonafice
interests.
Ne3otiations on an international iss ue are never a
s imple process and the proble1n of Germany :!_s most compleJL
So-;netimes, as

't'le

discovered at the opening of the Geneva Con-

ference, it is even difficult to decide whether the negotiators
are to sit at a round table, a square table or at separate tables.
Some of the issues which illUSt still be dealt with are going to
be, I can assure you, a l ot more perplexing than that.

At stake

in tlte c urrent negot iations may well be the future of many nations, the freedom of Europe and the peace of the world.

- '"

-

The task 't'Jhich confronts our ne't·l Secretary 0f St.ate
i n these negot i ations, therefore, is cne of the most demanding
which can fall to any man in public life.
I have no wish to acid to his burdens by anything that
I may say here today or,

~ndeed,

at any time.

Let me stress

that I have every confidence .:n the abili ;:y, the
the patriotism of Secretary Christian Herter.
I may add, is shared by the entire Senate.

and

e~~perience

Thi.s sentiment,

J·.1st a few weeks

ago we confirmed his appointment by a vote of 93 to 0.
Uhen Secretary Herter, as the representative of the
President, speaks in Geneva, he is speaki ng for all of us.

Let

there be no doubt on that score either abroad or at home.

Under

the Constitution, it is the Preo i dent .and his designdted representatives v1ho conduct the fore:!.en policy of tbe Uni ted State.s.
The Senate advises in this process anc, in the last analysis,
it must consent.

It is the :::res ident, hm-1ever, directly or

throuGh h:.t.s repre:3entatives, who must speak and act o:1 behalf
of the rest of us.
That does not mean that Senators co not have, in
their i ndi vidual capacities or as a body, any concern in matters
of

fore~gn

pol i cy.

Cn the contrary they have a responsibility

to cons ider any problem

wh~ch

affects--as foreign policy does--

the fortunes, the happiness, the very survival of the people of
th~

United States.

Senators have an

obligat~on

to inform, to
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dcl::ate, to tTy to make a constructive contribution to the
solution of such problems.

They have a clear-cut duty to

speak out on these problems, when conscience and reason compels, to speak out nob7ithstanding the fear of censure or

t~e

political attractions of silence.
May I say that many Members of the Senate have spoken
out on the German situation in recent months and the impact of
th0.ir 't·JOrds...l.. I believe, has been felt in a constructive fashion
in the basic policies from 'toJhich

"iilf'!

ar.e nm-1 negot:!.ating in

Geneva.
I, myself, had occasion to advance certain ideas on
Germany l23t

Feb~~ary

persuaded, then, that

in the Senate.
~1e "iilere

I did so because I was

drifting C:angerously into crisis

through a reluctance to face changes in the German situation
and a reticence to make adjustments in our policies to meet
ther.e changes.
occas~ons

today.

I have discussed German problems on several

since that time.

I propose to

speal~

of them again

I do so because these problems are of special concern

to you graduates.

It :.s your generation which 'toJill bear the

heaviest consequences of any failure of my generation to deal
competently 'tvith them.
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Background of

th~

German Conferences

Let 1ne point out at tlte outset that in present circumstances, there are several regions of the world in which there
e:Kists a serious potential c£ conflict.
Far &!.st.

~Jar

It can begin in the i:-liddle East.

can begin in the
It can begin in

Germany and Central Europe, the area which I propose to discuss
with you now.
I put this fact--this grim fact--to you bluntly.
~o

I

so because I am satisfied that as mature and responsible

Amer ~cans

you do not need to be spoon-fed on reassurances that

all is right with the v10rld.

I do so, too, because I believe

the tragedy of v1ar is best prevented by facing its possibilities
in a realistic fashion, by weighing these possibilities carefully,
by acting on them honestly and in good time,
I \vill not hold out to you the comforting thought that
nuclear war, being too terrible to contemplate is therefore too
destructive to be fought.

As a former teacher of history I find

this thought--despite its considerable currency--completely ilI

lusory.

It is unsupported by the histor.:tc exp8rience of mankind.
\Jar

past.

c~n

come today as it has come many times in the

It can come by the design of madness and aggression.

It

can come by accident: or miscalc"'..llation, deseite a basic desire
of all to avoid it.

It can be a limited conflict, as in Korea,
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or it can be of an extent which will reduce to radioactive
ruin the legacy of several thousand years of human civilization.
It is against this background, it seems to me, that
the present conference in Geneva and any others on Germany
which may

follo~1

must be seen.

German s::tuation is real.
the reality.
bravado.

The dange1-:- of conflict in the

It vlill not be dissolved by ignoring

It will not be dissolved by a breast-beating

Nor 'tvill it be dissolved by protestations of peace

on all sides, while the clouds of conflict continue to gather.
Cne cannot say at this time

~lith

any certainty t'lhether

it will be possible to end or even to reduce significantly the
danger of war in Germany anc Central Europe .

To find out the

chances for doing so is, after all, the underlying purpose of
the present conference.
It seems to me, ho ·1ever, that if there is to be a
valid hope fer. a more
accurate

du~ab_e

~dentification

of uar arises.

peace, it is to be found in an

of the sources from whence the danger

Then, if the

tv~ll

to peace is present in all,

or, to put it another way, if there exists a

s~ncere

desire on

the part of all to continue to live in a recognizable civilization, there will be a common effort to abate, control or eliminate these sources.

That common effort

w~_ll

take the form of

franl.: and honest negotiations, negotiations tvhich can produce
conditions of peace through mutual restraint, through concessions
t-7hich match concessions.
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Sources of Conflict in Germany
Let me try first to describe for you the principal
sources of potential conflict in Germany.

It is a dangerous

over-simplification, it seems to me, to see the danger of war
in that country solely in terms of the diabolical doings of
our o ponents.

That is a child-li

a-

gandisti c interpretation of the facts of international life.
To be sure the Soviet Union is ruthless in the way it strives
to expel freedom fTom all of Germany.
rulers

~1ill

not: only in
1.mdermine
overloo~~

le9..ve, unturned, no stone which they can lift-Ge~many

fre~dcm.

but anywhere in the world in order to
In recognizing thet, hmvever, let us not

in all honesty our own desire to terminate Soviet

influence in Germany and our
it uay

Indeed, the Russian

e~ds t

o~m

antipathy to communism wherever

in tha w·orld.

To conclude thtit the Russians are the sole cause of
th~-~roblem

in Germany is to ape the practices of Soviet propa-

gandc=t which have held that the problem is due solely to the
machinati ons of the United States and other Western nations.
A mutual

fing~r-pointing

of this kind may relieve feelings.

It may f::ll both sides 'tvith self-righteousness.

It does not

abate the danger i n Germany and Central Eurcpe.

The threat of

- 7 war remains and it is a threat not only to the well-being of
Russians but of Americans as well and 2 indeed, of all humanitl·
\,Je shall get closer to the reality if we see the
problem not as a one-sided matter but, in part, as a mutual
repulsion between freedom and communism, a repulsion which has
led to a cold war fought largely tvithout Harguis of Queensbury
rules.

That cold war, acting as it does, to keep a high state

of tension in Germany is, indeed one of the major sources of
the potential conflict.
But let us go on from there.

Let us recognize, too,

that the danger of war also derives from the close and unstable
contact cf hostile and ever-more powerfully armed military
forces--Western and Communist--in a divided Germany and, particularly, in a divided Berlin.

The contact, at any time, can

produce as it has, local military incidents or clashes.

It is

far from 1nconeivable that such incidents, in this day of
quickening countdowns, can precipitate a war of prestige, a
to~ar

of accident which no nation really wants.

It is risk

enough t·Jhen a war of annihilation can be set in motion by a
calculated word from Moscow.

It is risk beyond reason when

it can be set off by the madness or misjudgment of any one of
the many military commanders scattered through Germany.

- 8 Let us recognize, finally, that the danger of v1ar
in Germany derives in major part from still a third cause.
It cl.erives from the festering of a large collection of unsolved yolitical problems in and around that na.tion.

Princi-

pal among them is the continued division of Germany, fifteen
years after the war, and the continuance of a status for that
nat1 on "t·7hich while it is no longer cue of

v1ar

is not yet one

of peace.
These t,nsolved problems are related to the ideological
struggle bet\veen freedom and communism.

They are related to the

present juxtaposition of the armed forces of West and East.
Perhaps most important, however, they stern from nationalist
fears, rivalries, hopes and presumptions which have characterized
internat:';.onal relations \·Jithin Europe for generations.
All of these sources, then, contrihlte to the danger
of war in and around Germany.

Further, they pour their poisons

into the relations among Europeans--East and '(:Jest--heightening
the estrangement betv1een the

t~1o

segments of the continent and

acting to perpetuate the injustice suffered by millions who are
still denied genuine national equality and basic political
rights in Eastern Europe.

Finally in the world at large, they

conspire "t-7ith other sources in the l1iddle East and in the Fa,r
East to lceep the human race continuously on the edge of disaster.

- 9 -

Attitude Towards Conferences
It is with these sources of conflict in and around
Germany--all three of them--that the present conference and
those which may follow must come to grips.
they will serve little useful purpose.

On

Unless they do so
the contrary they

can do much harm.
As I have

al~eady

noted the period of negotiati on

on which we are no't'l embarked may end quickly or it may go on
for a long time.

It may· produce r.esult8 in terms of a more

durable peace or it may fail to do so.

I

da~esay

that the

people of the world will understand and appreciate an honest
try at achieving agreement even though its success may be
limited.

They

t~i ll

distorti or;. of these
hu~an

not understand, they will not appreciate a
conf~rences

which turns the deepest of

hopes, the hope for a secure peace, into a

f ~nger-pointing

exerci se in self-righteousne ss, into a search for the hollow
vic tor:!.es of propaganda

't'la't'.

I believe our Secretary of State is off to an excellent start in Geneva.
strained.

His remarks have been temperate and re-

They indicate clearly our e.arnest desire for fruitful

negotiations.

I wish that I could say the same for the attitude

manifested by the Soviet delegate.
Nevertheless, it will be

wc~ !l

to reserve judgment

on current negotiati ons until all the results are in, .

~ha. ~
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course seems to me best calculated to support the efforts of
those who represent us at Geneva.
lated to aid

~n

That course is best calcu-

bringing about sensible agreements for peace.

Possible Results of the Conferences
\. j:i.thout straying from that course I beH_eve it is
possible to incicate to you the various directions in which
these conferences can lead.
(1)

TI1ese conferenr.es can lead--again, let me he

blunt--they can lead to a dead-end,
guarantee of their success.

There is no built-in

They will certainly lead to a

dead-end if propaganda advantage takes precedence over peace
as the objective of any nation.

They will certainly lead to

that end if the words of conciliation are not encased in the
acts of accommodation.
Thess ccnfex-ences can fail, they will fail, if any
nation seeks a unilateral victory in them.

The fact of the

matter is that either all \vill "t'lin, in the sense that they
will strengthen their highest common interest in the survival
of a recognizable civilization, or all will lose.
T!Je "t\lill do well to recognize now the meaning of a
failure of these conferences to us and to others.

It does not

follow that \-tar \'lill come the day after, a month after. a year
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after.

It does follow that there is likely to be an increas2

in the tension in and around Germany, as well as elsewhere in
the world.

It does follow that the cost to all of us and to

others of cold war a.:1d of armaments \'lill rise.

It does follow

thG.i: an ever-increasing segment of the material and

manpo~;rer

resources of all nations will be diverted to military purposes.
I may note in this connection that 61 cer.ts out of every one
of our tax dollars that was spent by the federal government in
1958

~;rent

to maintain the defer..ses of the nation, and the fiscal

experience of other leading countries is similar.

It does fol-

lo\'1, too, that if these conferences fail, the brink of wer on
which the world nou walks is l i kely to become ever more narrow
as the pre ssures of potential conflict, unreli eved, continue
to pound relentlessly at the remaining f ootholds of peace.
( L)
t i on.
failed.

These conferences can l earl in a second dirP-c-

If they follow this path they will appear not to have
They might even appear to have succeeded ana yet t hey

will not succeed.

To put it another way, they may follmv the

pattern of the Geneva Conferences of Heads of State in
You will recall that meeting and i ts consequences.

1~55.

It pro-

duceci what seemed to be soluti ons but what, in fact, turned
out to be generalizations on peace.

It produced a momentary

abatement i n the cold war and with it, a grave readiness on

- 12 the part of free peoples to accept the illusion of peace as
the actuality of peace.

The real sources of confli ct, scarcely

touched at Geneva, continued to operate.
years

~Je

And in the ensuing

came very close to \'lar in Suez, Lebanon and the off-

shore isl.:mds of China.

The cold war 'toJas resumed.

The arms

race intensifi ed, with the Hest disadvantaged by its own la:dty.
vle shall repeat the pattern of Geneva-1955 in these

current conferences only at the peril of heightening the danger
of 't-mr in the future.

trle shall repeat i t if we assume that the

only threat to peace in the current cris i s is Soviet pressure.
The Russians may relax that pressure on Berlin for a month,
s i x months, indeed, indefinitely.

B~t

if that is all that is

produced by these conferences, the canger of war will not really
be lifted.

For as I tried to indic a t e at the outset the :Lnter-

national problem in and around Germany is fed, not by Soviet
diplomati c manoeuvering alone but by multiple sources.
(3)

This suggests, then, the final direction in

which these conferences can go.

If the will to peace is

genuine, i f the negotiaticns are honest, however hard the
bargaining,

t~_need

not end in failure.

Nor need they end

in an ill us i cn of accord vJhich masks a reality of discord.
They can produce a pattern of evolving peace in and around
Germany.

- 13 If you will recall the sources of conflict: which I
suggested earlier in my remarks, I believe you t-lill see,
readily, the nature of this pattern.

There will be, not merely

a momentary easing of Soviet pressure on \.Jest Berlin but a new
interim status for the entire city of Berlin with a United
Nations or some other form of international guarantee of its
security until it is once again the capital of all Germany.
There will be arrangements 't'Jhich 'trlill provide for the progressive unification of Germany and a progressive equalization of
the public rights and duties of all Germans--East and West.
There will be a progressive easement of the danger of war which
now arises from the close contact of communist and free forces
in Germany and from the accumulating power of the armaments-East and Hes t, German and non -German in that rez ion.

There

will t!e a progressive healing in all the relationships of the
nations--East and VJest--of the divided continent of Europe.
May I say in this connection that I hope that
~rtic~pation

limited to

th~

in the pr8sent meetings will cor.tinue to be

Russia.~

France, Brita:'..n and the United States and

the Germans of both East and Hest.

This limited membersh!£

seems to me the best way to progress, at this time, on the
immediate problems of Germany, and I believe Secretary Herter
is quite correct in insisting upon maintaining the limitation.
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However, I do not think it is too soon to begin
planning for a larger all-European conference.
su~h

It is in

conference that the representatives of Poland,

Czechoslovakia, of Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark,
irodeed of all the European countries can

mal~e

their voices

heard on the problems of peace of Europe and, on other issues
of primary interest to the people of that continent.

I r}7ould

hope, moreover, that in such a conference both the United
States and the Soviet Union would remain in the background
rather than in the foreground.
To return to the matter of the German conferences,
I should like to emphasize that
outcome.

~1e

cannot, alone, govern their

He cannot, alone assure that they will move in a

constructive direction.

Hhat the Russians do or do not do

obviously will have a profound influence upon them.

vfuat the

European nations, east .sm2_ west, and the Germans, east and west_,
contribute to or detract from them--directly or indirectly-will have a profound influence on their
When that has

be~n

out~ome.

said, however, let us

recogni~

that no single influence in thesP. conferences will be greater
than that of our country.

Let us

reco~nize

that fact, not

"t'lith arrogant pride but with a deep sense of humility, with
a full awareness of the grave responsibility which it places

- 15 upo..!l...Es.

It will

r~st

heavily with those who speak for the

nat i on in these conferences--the Presid2nt and the Secretary
o-: Statc..z. to vlOrk 't-Jith dedi cat i on tc prevent these conferences
f~om

endir.g in failure.

It will

r~st

heavily with them to avoid

c:reating the illusion of settlemen t 't\Then, in fact, there is no
settlement.

It will rest heavily with them to lead this nation

in concert wi th others towards agreeoents for an eguitable and
~lving
lacl~

peace in Germany.

If they do so lead they v1ill not

for support at heme or from decent men and women throughout

the world.

